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The significance of the proposed reform of competition
policy3
Consider the following questions:
Which policy applies to all sectors of the economy?
Which policy has extra-territorial application and may
penalise companies based in countries far away from the
European Union? In which policy can the European
Commission enter and search the premises of any
company anywhere in the EU and eventually impose
fines on them of up to 10% of their world-wide turnover?
In which policy does the EC Treaty empower the
Commission to issue decisions or directives to member
states without prior approval of the Council or
Parliament? In which policy must the member states ask
for authorisation by the Commission before
implementing national measures? In which policy does
the Commission have to deal with more than 1,300 cases
per year? Which policy is enforced directly by the
Commission? Which policy is enforced with an
implementing regulation that dates back to the very
early years of the Community and has not changed yet?
The common answer to all these questions is
“competition policy”. This policy, whose objectives
and enforcement procedures have remained virtually
unchanged since the inception of the European
Community, is now being modernised and decentralised.
The Commission has proposed a new Regulation4 for
the application of Articles 81 & 82 of the Treaty to
replace the old Regulation 17/62.
The proposed Regulation is significant for several
reasons:
(a) For the first time in the history of the EC, it empowers
national authorities, including national courts, to
apply the anti-trust exemption in Article 81(3)
together with the prohibitions in Articles 81(1) & 82.
Granting exemptions has always been the prerogative
of the Commission.
(b) For the first time, national authorities are required to
apply Community law instead of national law
whenever cross-border trade is affected.
(c) For the first time, national authorities are required to
consult the Commission before making any
decisions.
(d) For the first time, national courts have to submit
copies of their rulings to the Commission.
(e) The Commission will have the right to appear before
national courts.
(f) And, the 40-year “prior notification” regime will
end. Under the current Regulation 17/62, companies
that want to benefit from the exception in Article
81(3) must first notify their agreements with other
companies to the Commission for approval.
Otherwise, if these agreements are found to
contravene Article 81(1), they are automatically
null and void.
Why is reform necessary?
Although the market economy is believed to rely on
“individualistic competition” it is in fact founded on an
elaborate network of agreements between companies,
their suppliers, distributors and customers. These
agreements are useful only if they are enforceable in
courts of law. Legally binding agreements are, therefore,
the bedrock of modern economy.
Yet, almost any agreement between companies may
fall foul of the competition rules of the EC Treaty. This
Article bans all agreements that restrict competition and
affect cross-border trade in the Community. Since, by
definition, an agreement does restrict the freedom of
action of the parties involved, many corporate
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agreements fall within the scope of the prohibition of
Article 81(1).
Because the Community system of competition
imposes a blanket ban on restrictive agreements, it also
provides for an exception of those agreements
that either do not
distort competition or
whatever  distortions





principle  of “exemption
by authorisation”. In
effect, companies must notify their agreements to the
Commission and ask for exemption even when it is
obvious that they do not cause any distortions to
competition.
This system suffers from a number of structural
weaknesses:
(a) Notifications do not catch “hard-core”5 cartels
(apparently only nine prohibitions have resulted
from notifications without any subsequent
complaint).6
(b) National authorities are prevented from granting
exemptions, resulting in heavier workload for the
Commission. This state of affairs is not sustainable
after enlargement of the EU.
(c) Having to process notifications distracts the
Commission from its real task of uncovering and
prosecuting hard-core cartels.
(d) Business bears excessive compliance costs.
(e) Agreements that fall within Article 81(1) are not
legally secure or enforceable in a court of law unless
first notified to the Commission.
(f) Yet, due to excessive workload generated by the
many notifications, the Commission issues only
informal (administrative) “comfort” letters7 whose
legality in national courts is a matter of dispute.
With respect to the usefulness of the notification
system, it has been argued by its proponents (mostly
business representatives) that its main purpose is not to
catch cartels but to provide a “service” to business.
Although they also acknowledge that the law advances
mostly through “negative” (i.e. prohibitive) decisions
which interpret the prohibitions in Articles 81 and 82
and through the various guidelines and explanatory
notices, they also believe that notifications offer to the
Commission an important picture of the types of
agreements concluded among undertakings and enable
it to draw implications about clarifications on
competition policy that may be necessary. This, they
argue, facilitates a pro-active role in enforcement on the
part of the Commission.
It seems that the issue is not how or whether to relieve
the Commission by shifting the burden of enforcement
to national competition authorities. After all, for the
Community as a whole, it makes little difference whether
Community or national resources are expended in
enforcement. The real issue is whether such re-allocation
of tasks will raise the efficiency of enforcement by either
enabling the Commission to catch more cartels or
empowering national authorities to do a better job.




In addition, it has
been argued that the
notification system
has grown to such,
unmanageable9 ,
extent because the
Commission has interpreted very widely the prohibition
of Article 81(1). Exemptions and “negative clearance”10
are sought by business because almost everything is
illegal. If the Commission had given more weight to the
economic effects of agreements, there would be less
need for notifications. Yet it would have been very
difficult to enforce competition policy on the basis of
such a “rule of reason” at the initial stages of the
Community when there was little experience with
competition policy and the concepts of competition in
the Treaty were yet underdeveloped.
Aims, means and expected results of reform
The proposed reform primarily seeks to:
(a) create a “directly applicable exception system”
where no prior authorisation by the Commission is
necessary;
(b) apportion the responsibility of enforcement of
Articles 81(1) and 82 and assessment of the
applicability of Article 81(3) between the
Commission and national authorities, with much of
the enforcement being undertaken by national
authorities while the Commission concentrates on
major, multi-country, infringements and policy
development.
These aims are to be achieved by multiple means.
The main instruments of reform are:
(a) amendment of implementing regulations
(Regulation 17/62 and the various regulations
applying competition rules to transport);
(b) introduction of a new rule about the conditions
under which EC law and national laws are applicable
(EC law is to be applied whenever cross-border or
intra-Community trade is affected);
(c) establishment of new cooperation procedures
between the Commission and national authorities
(information exchange, sharing of responsibility
and tasks, consultation).
If the proposed Regulation is approved, the
regulatory environment for business should improve.
There should be less bureaucracy, more efficient use of
public resources and fewer distortions of competition,
which hurt both companies and consumers alike. More
The European Commission will soon
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specifically, benefits will be realised from:
(a) a larger number of enforcers of EC competition law;
(b) a more efficient use of Commission resources;
(c) an increase in the powers of investigation of the
Commission [it has asked for powers to search the
homes of business executives];
(d) a levelled playing-field brought about by application
of EC law to more cases; less parallel application of
national and EC law; clearer delineation of tasks
between national authorities;
(e) no submission of notifications to the Commission
and therefore less bureaucratic procedures to be
complied with by business;
(f) higher certainty for business in contractual relations.
However, as mentioned earlier, the new policy which
is outlined in the draft Regulation also has a downside.
The next section examines the most serious drawbacks
of the reform in relation to the main provisions of the
draft Regulation.
The risks of the reform in relation to the main
provisions of the proposed new Regulation
Article 1: Direct applicability: Practices11 caught by
Article 81(1), which do not satisfy Article 81(3), and
Article 82, are prohibited.12
This is one of the most important innovations
introduced by the draft Regulation. In addition to Articles
81(1) & 82, Article 81(3) is now also directly applicable.
This means that Article 81(1) must be considered in
conjunction with Article 81(3). Since prior notification
will not be required, it is up to undertakings themselves
to assess, first, whether their agreements generate the
positive effects mentioned in Article 81(3), second,
whether those positive effects are sufficient to justify
application of Article 81(3) and, third, that their
agreements do not retain any hard-core practices that are
always prohibited.
There is concern that legal uncertainty will increase
rather than decrease because undertakings will not be
able to obtain either a formal exemption or a
negative clearance. This is because no one will know for
certain whether their agreements are truly compatible
with the EC rules of competition until someone complains
or takes them to court and loses the case.
Article  3: Relationship between Articles 81 & 82
and national competition laws: Where a practice
infringing Article 81




applies to the exclu-
sion of national com-
petition laws.
Since it is relatively easy to prove that cross-border
trade is affected, most competition authorities will in
reality apply EC law. Parallel application of EC and
national law will be rare.
An issue that has been raised by some commentators
is that this Article appears to preclude application of
national laws with more restrictive provisions than EC
law. The question is how likely that is in practice.
Another criticism that has been made, is that this
Article refers to trade effects with no mention of restriction
of competition. It has been argued that this would
prevent national law from applying in those situations
where Community law would be inapplicable because
of no restriction of competition. However, it seems to me
that this is an unfounded argument. If there is no restriction
of competition then Article 81 would not apply. With
respect to Article 82, there is no reference to restriction
of competition because abuse of dominance is a distortion
of competition. Therefore, if Article 81 is inapplicable
because not all of its conditions are satisfied, then
national law would apply, while for Article 82 what
matters is the existence or not of abuse of dominance.
A point that has not been made by other commentators
is that national authorities may also have to apply
competition rules to undertakings which have special or
exclusive rights conferred to them by the state. In
comparable situations, the Commission would also
apply Article 86(1) in conjunction with Article 81 or
Article 82 to the actions of member states. What will
happen, however, when an undertaking claims that its
actions are justified under Article 86(2)? In the case-law
it is recognised that the assessment needed under Article
86(2) is a task for the Commission. But the case-law
refers to the tasks of the Commission as opposed to the
tasks of the member states. Does it prevent national
competition authorities from acting on their own
initiative?
Article 5: Powers of the competition authorities of
the Member States: The competition authorities of the
Member States shall have the power in individual cases
to apply the prohibition in Article 81(1), where the
conditions of Article 81(3) are not fulfilled, and the
prohibition in Article 82. Where the conditions for
prohibition are not met, they may decide not to take
action.
This is one of the most significant provisions of the
draft Regulation. National authorities may not grant
exemptions, as can the Commission at present. But they
may refrain from prohibiting an agreement under Article
81(1) if Article 81(3) applies. The decisions of the
national authorities will be binding only in their own




sion first unveiled its
ideas in a White Paper,
there was concern
about “forum
shopping” – that firms
would petition the national authority which would be
perceived to be the most favourably predisposed towards
their case. The fact that decisions will be valid only in
the territory of each authority and that they will be able
to enforce the prohibitive part of Article 81 (rather than
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grant exemptions) have dispelled fears about a “race to
the bottom”, where the norms of the least strict authority
would  prevail across the EU. However, there is still
concern that undertakings will be exposed to multiple
jeopardy, that costs of defence and prosecution will rise
and that the law
will not be applied
homogeneously, as
some authorities






be subject to decisions by more than one authority. A
defendant may end up being involved in multiple suits
in several member states. This will increase costs. By
implication, a plaintiff may have to lodge proceedings
in several member states to bring an end to a practice
across the EU. A possibility that cannot be completely
discounted is that firms that want decisions to have EU-
wide coverage may still have to complain to the
Commission. As a result, the workload of the Commission
may not be lightened as much as it hopes.
Article 6: Powers of the national courts: National
courts before which the prohibition in Article 81(1) is
invoked shall also have jurisdiction to apply Article
81(3).
Some observers have voiced a concern that through
the exercise of the economic judgement which is
necessary for the application of the full Article 81, the
application of EC law will diverge across the EU.
It has also been questioned whether the courts have
the requisite knowledge to carry out the economic
balancing act required by Article 81(3). There are two
answers to this question. First, the plaintiffs will assist
the courts with arguments and analysis. Second, the
Commission does not really carry out a proper economic
cost-benefit test, balancing costs of reduction of
competition against the potential benefits of
cooperation. In effect it examines whether Article 81(1)
applies, then considers whether the conditions of Article
81(3) are met and then declares Article 81(1) inapplicable.
The occasions where conditions are attached to a decision
so as to reduce the negative effects of an agreement are
rare.
Article 11: Cooperation between the Commission
and the competition authorities of the Member States:
The Commission and national competition authorities
shall apply the Community competition rules in close
cooperation. The Commission shall transmit to
competition authorities copies of the most important
documents relating to its intended decisions. National
authorities shall inform the Commission accordingly at
the outset of their own proceedings. Where competition
authorities intend to adopt a decision requiring that an
infringement be brought to an end, accepting
commitments or withdrawing the benefit of a block
exemption regulation, they shall first consult the
Commission. No later than one month before adopting
the decision, they shall provide the Commission with
a summary of the case and with copies of the most
important documents. At the Commission’s request,
they shall provide it with a copy of any other document
relating to the









relieve competition authorities of their competence to
apply Articles 81 and 82.
Consultation may reduce the possibility of uneven
enforcement and prevent a race to the bottom. However,
national authorities cannot be forced to take action by
opening investigations. Under Article 5, national
authorities may only take negative decisions (i.e. finding
of infringement). Since they cannot grant exemption
when the conditions of Article 81(3) apply, they will
simply have to decide that there are no grounds for
action on their part (i.e. reject complaints). In these cases
they are not required to consult the Commission. Will
the act of informing the Commission of initiation of
proceedings be enough in cases where national
authorities decide there are no grounds for further action?
More broadly, will summaries of cases suffice when the
issue at hand, for example, is the method of collection
of data?
When the Commission disagrees with a national
authority it will be able to withdraw the case from that
authority. This means that in a system of 16 enforcement
authorities (or 29 [=15+1+13] in the near future), the
Commission’s view will prevail and will stifle
experimentation and innovation by the authorities best
placed to assess the impact of competition law and anti-
competitive practices.
Article 13: Suspension or termination of
proceedings: Where competition authorities of two or
more Member States are acting against the same practice,
the fact that one authority is dealing with the case shall
be sufficient grounds for the others to suspend the
proceedings before them or to reject the complaint. The
Commission may likewise reject a complaint. Where
national competition authorities or the Commission
receive a complaint against a practice which has already
been dealt by another authority, it may reject it.
It has been argued that since there is no stipulation
of mandatory suspension of proceedings or rejection of
complaints, undertakings will be exposed to the risk of
both multiple simultaneous proceedings and sequential
proceedings. But even if the wording of Article 13 is
interpreted to mean an unequivocal requirement for
suspension of proceedings, the same cannot be said for
rejection of complaints. Moreover, the requirement for
suspension refers to simultaneous cases. National
The future enforcement of competition
rules will have to rely on close
cooperation between national authorities
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authorities may re-open old cases on their own initiative.
These possibilities have led some commentators to
the conclusion that there will be a tendency towards
stricter enforcement (since national authorities will be
able to issue only negative decisions) with a
disintegrating effect on the internal market. While it is
true that national authorities will be able mostly to
enforce prohibitions, it is not clear why they will tend
to focus on the negative effects on their markets and
ignore the positive effects in other markets. If they apply
EC law they will have to consider the totality of the
effects across the EU. More importantly, the defendants
will point them out. It is also worth noting that in this
case, EC practice favours defendants because it is mostly
sufficient to identify any non-insignificant positive
effects of cooperation in order to secure inapplicability
of Article 81(1) (provided the cooperation in question
does not contain hard-core restrictions).
Article 16: Uniform application of Community
competition law:  National courts and competition
authorities shall use every effort to avoid any decision
that conflicts with decisions adopted by the Commission.
Uniform application of EC law also depends on an
important group of “outsiders”: the corporate lawyers
and the academics. They learn and keep themselves up
to date by reading and analysing Commission decisions
and rulings of the EU courts. In a decentralised system
where most decisions will be taken by national authorities
and courts, it is not clear how they can maintain access
to decisions and rulings across the various member
states. The lawyers and the academics also contribute to
the development of competition policy through their
research and writings. If they do not have access to the
various national decisions to compare and evaluate,
policy development and adjustment may also suffer.
In the future, EU courts will be able to rule on
competition issues not in the context of appeals against
Commission decisions [the most frequent way by which
the courts expound on competition] but through requests
for preliminary rulings from national courts. One
wonders, in this respect, how effective the preliminary
rulings will be in shedding light on broad issues of
competition that cut across member states.
Concluding remarks
There is no doubt that the reform is significant and that
it will have a non-negligible effect on business and
national competition authorities. What is not certain is
whether the positive effects of the reform will outweigh
the negative ones. Companies fear that the Community
will become a less predictable place in which to do
business. They will not be able to obtain exemptions
from the Commission while they will be vulnerable to
actions by 16 different authorities. Even though the
substantive rules will be the same, companies will still
have to cope with up to 16 different sets of procedural
law. Not surprisingly, some companies and many
corporate lawyers would prefer the existing Community
system.
Whether indeed the legal environment in which
companies operate will become less predictable will
very much depend on the actions of national competition
authorities and on the extent and quality of cooperation
among these authorities and between them and the
Commission. The precise form and procedures of
cooperation are not yet known. The only thing which is
certain at this point in time is that the final chapter on
the reform will be written much after the proposed
Regulation is adopted by the Council.
________________
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NOTES
1 This article continues the analysis of the proposed reform of
competition policy that appeared in Eipascope, 2001, No. 2,
pp. 16-22. My colleagues Peter Goldschmidt and Christoph
Lanz, in their article “Maybe Definitely – Definitely Maybe”,
examined the proposals from a legal perspective. The present
article considers the necessity of the reform and the expected
benefits together with the risks involved for businesses and
enforcement authorities.
2 Professor, European Institute of Public Administration. I am
indebted to Christoph Demmke and Veerle Deckmyn for
comments and suggestions on an earlier version. I am solely
responsible for the contents of this article.
3 This article draws on a conference that was held at EIPA in
December 2001 to examine the merits of reform of EC
competition policy. The conference was organised in
cooperation with the Hamburg Institute of International
Economics, HWWA. The papers that were presented at the
conference have been published in the January 2002 issue of
the HWWA journal Intereconomics, vol. 37(1).
4 COM(2000) 582 final, 27/9/2000.
5 A “hard-core” cartel is an agreement to raise prices, reduce
output or share markets among the members of the cartel.
6 See the preamble of COM(2000) 582 final, 27/9/2000.
7 The “comfort” letters are not formal Commission decisions.
They are administrative acts that express the view of the
Commission, in the form of a letter, that on the basis of the
information submitted by the parties concerned, the
Commission found no apparent infringements of competition
rules. National courts may take these letters into account, but
they are not bound by them since they are not Community acts.
8 See P. Nicolaides, Development of a System for Decentralised
Enforcement of Competition Policy, Intereconomics, 2002,
vol. 37(1).
9 Some practitioners believe that the 250 or so notifications per
year do not impose an excessive burden on the Commission.
If, as the Commission claims, they hardly raise any important
issues, the Commission should have little difficulty to process
them quickly.
10An agreement is “exempted” when it falls within Article 81(1)
but can satisfy the conditions for exemption under Article
81(3). By contrast, an agreement receives negative clearance
when it does not fall within Article 81(1).
11For simplicity, the term “practices” in this paper refers to
actions by individual undertakings, agreements between
undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and
concerted practices in the meaning of Articles 81 & 82.
12In italics are the main provisions of each article of the draft
Regulation. !